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This article investigates the commonalities between motivations and emotions as evidenced in a 
broad range of animal models, including humans. In particular, a focus is placed on how these 
models can have utility within the context of working robotic systems. Behavior-based control 
serves as the primary vehicle through which emotions and motivations are integrated into robots 
ranging from hexapods to wheeled robots to humanoids. 
Starting from relatively low-level organisms, such as the sowbug and praying mantis, and then 
moving upward to human interactions, a progression of motivational/emotional models and 
robotic experiments is reported. These capture a wide set of affective phenomena including 
social attachment, emotional behavior in support of interspecies interaction, multiscale temporal 
affect, and various motivational drives such as hunger and fear.   
 




It has been a while since I have had to wrestle with the nebulous, relatively unscientific, term 
“emotions”.  In (Arkin, 1998), I stated that “Modifying Associate U.S. Supreme Court John 
Paul Stevens’ famous quotation, we can’t define emotion, but we know it when we see it”.  
Granted, significant advances have been recently made in understanding the neural 
underpinnings of emotional structure in humans (Dolan, 2002), where “emotions represent 
complex psychological and physiological states that, to a greater or lesser degree, index 
occurrences of value” (where value refers to “an organism’s facility to sense whether events in 
its environment are more or less desirable.”) Much of this recent work, however, is concerned 
with discovering the neurobiological underpinnings of emotions in humans and it is somewhat 
far removed from the more immediate needs of roboticists whose goal it is to design 
functioning, reliable artifacts in the real world.  
While many scientists and philosophers choose to argue long and hard about the definitions of 
this term, classifying theories into “shallow” or “deep”, (Sloman, this volume) most roboticists 
tend to be far more pragmatic and somewhat irreverent towards biology. We instead ask the 
question, what capabilities can “emotions”, however defined, endow a robot with that an 
unemotional robot cannot possess? (Minsky, 1986) put a spin on this research hypothesis in 
stating, “The question is not whether intelligent machines can have any emotions, but whether 
machines can be intelligent without any emotions”. 
Unfortunately, the situation is even worse than stated above regarding the relevance of emotion 
to robotics. Most ethologists, scientists who study animal behavior in a natural setting, generally 
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use the term “motivation” instead of “emotion”. As much of our group’s research historically 
has been derived from ethological studies, there is a strong tendency to continue to use this term 
in this article over the seemingly vague word emotions, even in the context of describing human 
behavior. Human behavior, at least from my perspective as a roboticist, can be characterized to 
a great extent through ethological studies, e.g., (Blurton Jones, 1972) that abstract away from 
neural models of brain function in favor of observational studies.  It is also unclear, at least to 
me, as to where within the range of animal species the ability to possess emotions begins. Does 
a {paramecium, sowbug, canine, human} express emotion? These questions seem better left to 
others than myself, as I am unconvinced that their pursuit will lead to more intelligent robots, 
which some consider a new species in their own right (Menzel and D’Alusio, 2000).  
Motivations, however, tend to be more general than emotions, especially when concerned with 
human performance (See Rolls, Kelley, this volume). They often involve the articulation of 
goals that result in the performance of goal-achieving behavior. Thus when pressed to define the 
distinction between emotions and motivations I state the following working definition (caveat - 
this is a roboticist speaking): emotions constitute a subset of motivations that provide support 
for an agent’s survival in a complex world. They are not related to the formulation of abstract 
goals that are produced as a result of deliberation. Motivations and emotions affect behavioral 
performance, but motivation can additionally lead to the formulation of concrete goal-achieving 
behavior, at least in humans, whereas emotions are concerned with modulating existing 
behaviors in support of current activity. In this regard, motivations might additionally invoke 
specific behaviors to accomplish more deliberative tasks or plans (e.g., strategies for obtaining 
food). 
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It is my view that motivations (and emotions) affect the underlying control of a cybernetic 
system by altering the underlying behavioral parameters of the agent, whether it is biological or 
artifactual, (i.e., a robot). Certain internal states, which are used to represent various 
motivation/emotional qualities, are maintained by processes that reflect the agent’s time course 
through the environment as well as its perception of the immediate situation. Using this 
definition, it then becomes our goal, as roboticists, to design systems that can maintain this 
internal motivational state and use it to produce behavior in ways that are consistent with 
intelligent performance in the real world. 
Motivations/emotions provide two potential crucial roles for robotics: 
1. Survivability: Emotions serve as one of the mechanisms to complete autonomy and that 
helps natural systems cope with the world. (Darwin, 1972) postulated that emotions 
serve to increase the survivability of a system.  Often a critical situation does not allow 
time for deliberation, and emotions modulate the behavioral response of the agent 
directly. 
2. Interaction: Many robots that are created to function in close proximity to people need 
to be able to relate to them in predictable and natural ways. This is primarily a limitation 
of the human, whom we do not have the luxury of reprogramming. In order to make 
robots interact effectively and efficiently with people it is useful for them to react in 
ways that humans are familiar and comfortable with (See Norman, this volume). 
 
This article will present a range of research results that attempts to address the issues above 
while spanning the phylogenetic complexity of various animal models: i.e., moving up the food 
chain. We first look at the lowly sowbug as a basis for incorporating motivation behavior, then 
move up to predatory insects, specifically the praying mantis. Moving into the realm of humans 
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we then investigate intra-species behavior, the mother-child relationship, and then inter-species 
interaction in the relationship of a robotic dog with its owner. Finally we summarize a relatively 
complex model of motivations that includes multiple timescales formulated in terms of traits, 
attitudes, moods, and emotions. Hopefully the journey through these various biological entities 
and their robotic counterparts will help demonstrate a basis for commonality of emotion and 
motivation across all species, while simultaneously encouraging others to loosen their 
definitional belt a bit regarding just what emotions are. 
2. Tolman's Schematic Sowbug and its Robotic Counterpart 
 
Our first study looks at a psychological model of the behavior of a sowbug. Tolman introduced 
his concept of a schematic sowbug, which was a product of his earlier work on purposive 
behaviorism developed in the early 1920's. (Innis, 1999) states: 
 Initially, in Tolman's purposive behaviorism, behavior implied a performance, the 
achievement of an altered relationship between the organism and its environment; 
behavior was functional and pragmatic; behavior involved motivation and cognition; 
behavior revealed purpose. 
Motivation was incorporated into the tight connection between stimulus and response that the 
prevailing behaviorist view largely ignored While Tolman also developed the notion of the 
cognitive map, this was not used in his Sowbug model. Instead motivation was used to create 
additional inputs to his overall controller, something that more traditional behaviorists tended to 
ignore. These relations were expressed  (Tolman, 1951) in the determination of a behavioral 
response (B) as a function receiving inputs from environmental stimuli (S), physiological drive 
(P) (or motivation), heredity (H), previous training (T), and age (A). 
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(Tolman, 1939) initially proposed the concept of the schematic sowbug as a thought experiment 
to express the concepts of purposive behaviorism. It was infeasible at the time to think of 
physically constructing a robotic implementation of his Sowbug, even if he had cared to. Space 
prevents a detailed description of his model; and the reader is referred to (Tolman 1939, Endo 
and Arkin, 2001) for the details.   The Sowbug was, in Tolman’s view, a simple creature 
capable of moving autonomously through an obstacle strewn area in search of food to maintain 
its existence, where its performance is affected by drives, stimuli, and the other factors 
mentioned earlier. Described at a high-level, Tolman’s schematic sowbug consisted of: 
• A receptor organ: a set of multiple photo-sensors that perceive light (or any given 
stimuli) in the environment and mounted on the front-end surface of the sowbug, 
forming an arc. 
• Movement was based on the following components for determining the sowbug’s 
behavioral response: 
o Orientation distribution that indicates the output values of the photo-sensors 
serving as environmental stimuli.    
o Orientation/Progression tensions which correspond to the motivational demand. 
The term tension here refers to the readiness of the Sowbug to pursue a 
stimulus, the readiness in this case being derived from hunger (i.e., the hungrier 
it is (motivation), the greater is its readiness (tension). The orientation tension 
refers to its readiness to turn, while the progression tension indicates the 
Sowbug’s readiness to move forward. 
o Orientation vector which when generated rotates the sowbug in the appropriate 
direction.   
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o Progression distribution that reflects the strength (or certainty) of a specific 
stimulus.  
o Progression vectors that represent the velocities of the left- and right-hand side 
motors of the sowbug, similar to what (Braitenberg, 1984), in his book Vehicles, 
described nearly 40 years later. 
 
The orientation/progression tensions are the key underlying mechanisms by which motivation is 
introduced into the model. These tensions modulate the sowbug’s response to given 
environmental objects (e.g., food) by representing a variable for motivational drives (e.g., 
hunger). The result is the orientation need, which directly alters the strength of the agent’s 
motor response to a given stimulus. 
What is remarkable is that Tolman's schematic sowbug was the first prototype in history that 
actually described a behavior-based robotics architecture, to the best of our knowledge. It was a 
half-century before (Brooks, 1986) developed the subsumption architecture. Past training and 
internal motivational state also affect the sowbug’s behavior. Endo (Endo and Arkin, 2001) 
created a partial robotic incarnation of Tolman’s schematic Sowbug.  His software, called eBug1 
(Emulated Sowbug), supports both simulations (Fig. 1 left) and robot experiments (Fig. 1 right) 
that reflect many of the details of Tolman’s model. 
Tolman’s purposive behaviorism spoke to many of the same issues that modern behavior-based 
robotics architectures address (Arkin, 98): how to produce intelligent behavior from multiple 
concurrent and parallel sensorimotor (behavioral) pathways, how to coordinate their outputs 
meaningfully, how to introduce the notion of goal-oriented behavior, how to include motivation 
                                                          
1  EBug is available at http://www.cc.gatech.\\edu/ai/robot-lab/research/ebug/ 
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and emotion, and how to permit stages of developmental growth to influence behavior. 
Tolman’s approach has yet to be fully exploited for motivational and emotional control in real 
robots, and indeed may never be as more modern theories of affect now exist, but the work is 
certainly of historical significance to both roboticists and those in psychology who have the 
vision to create computational models that can serve as the basis for robotic intelligence. 
 
     
Figure 1:     (Left) eBug Simulation of Schematic Sowbug.  Initially the two colored objects 
appear to both be potential food sources. The robot learns over time that the light colored 
object is an attractive (food) stimulus, while the darker object is an aversive one, and 
changes its behavior as a result. (Right) eBug controlling an actual robot to react to the 
same colored stimuli. The robot is attracted to the object on the right. 
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3. Motivational behavior in Mantids and Robots  
 
Moving on from the lowly sowbug to animals that prey on insects (i.e., the praying mantis), we 
strive to understand how the basic drives (motivations to ethologists) affect their behavior in an 
attempt to create similar models for robotic systems.  One behavioral model based upon schema 
theory  (Arbib, 1992) and earlier work applying schema theory to frog behavior (Arbib 1987) 
has been used to represent the insect’s participation with its world. This involves the extension 
of our robotic schema-theoretic approach (Arkin, 1989) to incorporate internal motivational 
processes in addition to external perception. Fortunately, schema theory is quite amenable to 
this strategy for the mantis, which we have demonstrated both in simulations and in actual 
robotic experiments (Arkin et al., 2000). One early example of integrating motivation into 
navigation was forwarded by (Arbib and Lieblich, 1977) that made explicit use of drives and 
motivations integrated into spatial representations, and although not implemented, explained a 
variety of data of rats running mazes. Others (e.g., Steels, 1994; McFarland, 1993) have also 
explored similar issues experimentally. Our overall approach (Arkin, 1990) is also related to 
ecological and cognitive psychology as formulated by (Gibson, 1977) and (Neisser, 1976) 
respectively.   
As we have seen earlier, the efficacy of visual stimuli to release a response (i.e., type of 
behavior, intensity, and frequency) is determined by a range of factors: the stimulus situation 
(e.g., form, size, velocity, and the spatio-temporal relationship between the stimulus and the 
animal); the current state of internal variables of the organism, especially those related to 
motivational changes (e.g., season of the year, food deprivation, time interval between feeding 
the animal and the time of experimentation) and; previous experience with the stimulus (e.g., 
learning, conditioning, habituation). 
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In a joint project between researchers at Georgia Tech and the Instituto Technológico 
Autónomo de México (ITAM) in Mexico City, a behavioral model was created (Arkin, 
Cervantes-Perez, and Weitzenfeld, 1998) that captures the salient aspects of the mantid that 
incorporates 4 different visuomotor behaviors (a subset of the animal’s complete behavioral 
repertoire): 
• Prey Acquisition: This behavior first produces orienting, followed by approach (if 
necessary), then grasping by the mantis when the target is within reach. 
• Predator Avoidance: At the most abstract level, this produces flight of the insect, but 
when considered in more detail there are several forms of avoidance behavior. A large 
flying stimulus can yield either a ducking behavior or a fight-type response referred to 
as deimatic behavior where the insect stands up and opens its wings and forearms to 
appear larger than it is. 
• Mating: This is an attractive behavior generated by a female stimulus during the mating 
season that produces an orienting response in the male followed by approach, then 
actual mating. 
• Chantlitaxia: [Etymology: from the Nahuatl word “Chantli” which means shelter or 
refuge, and “taxia” from the Latin for attraction (Cervantes-Perez, 2003)]. This involves 
an agent's search for a proper habitat for survival and growth. The praying mantis climbs 
to higher regions (e.g., vegetation) when older, actively searching for a suitable place to 
hunt. 
This model incorporates motivational variables that affect the selection of these motivated 
behaviors. For predator avoidance, fear is the primary motivator; for prey acquisition, hunger 
serves a similar purpose; while for mating, the sex-drive dominates. These variables are 
Arkin  12 
modeled quite simply in this instance, but they may be extended to incorporate factors such as 
diurnal, seasonal, and climatic cycles and age-related factors as discussed in some of the other 
models that follow in this article. The behavioral controller, derived from (Cervantes-Perez et 
al., 1993) and depicted in Figure 2, was implemented on a small hexapod robot.  
 
Figure 2:  Implemented Behavioral Model. A schema-style architecture (left)  involves fusing the outputs of 
the behaviors together cooperatively, while a colony-style architecture (right)  involves competitive priority-
based arbitration for action selection (Arkin, 1998). 
 
In this implementation, rather than responding to movement, as is the case for the mantis, the 
robot responds instead to colors.  Green objects represent predators, purple objects represent 
mates, orange objects that are at least twice as tall as they are wide represent hiding-places, and 
all other orange objects represent prey. The robot maintains three motivational variables that 
represent the robot's hunger, fear, and sex-drive. Initially, the value of each of these variables is 
set to zero. Arbitrarily, the hunger and sex-drive levels increase linearly with time, with the 
hunger increasing at twice the rate of the sex-drive. When the robot has contacted a prey or 
mate, the robot is considered to have eaten or mated with the object, and the relevant 
motivational variable resets to zero.  Contact is determined by the position of the prey or mate 
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color blob in the image captured by the camera mounted on the front of the robot. In this case, 
the object is considered to be contacted when the bottom of the object blob is in the lower five 
percent of the image. The fear level remains zero until a predator becomes visible.  At that time, 
the fear variable is set to a predetermined high value. When the predator is no longer visible, the 
fear level resets to zero.  
Grey Walter’s turtle (Walter, 1953) had an alternative perspective for being ‘motivated’ 
avoiding the use of state variables and encapsulating it within the behaviors themselves: e.g., 
Avoid light unless you are hungry for a recharge. This type of motivation affects the action 
selection of the behaviors based on external immediate stimuli, whereas a more explicit 
representation format is encoded in the mantis model. 
In the robotic implementation of the mantis model, motivational values directly influence the 
underlying behavioral control parameters, altering them in a manner consistent with the agent’s 
needs. For example, when the robot has a high hunger level, and food appears as a stimulus, the 
behavior associated with moving towards food is strong. On the other hand, if the robot does 
not have a high hunger motivational value, it will ignore the food stimulus. Similar behavioral 
reactions occur for the fear motivational value in the presence of predators, and the sex drive 
variable when a mate is present. The behavior that dominates the overall performance of the 
hexapod is determined to a great extent by the internal motivational variables and is no longer 
solely driven by the visual stimuli present in the robot’s current field of view.  Figure 3 
illustrates one of many examples of the robot’s behavior using this model (Arkin et al., 2000). It 
is relatively straightforward to incorporate more complex motivational modeling if it were 
available, although this work was reserved for more complex species, as discussed in sections 
4-6 of this article. Examples of more complex relationships might include an increase of the 
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hunger variable after sex or perhaps a concomitant increase in fear sensitivity during sex. These 
relationships can in principle be determined neurologically, if not behaviorally. The 
relationships may change in time and could possibly be said to define the ‘emotional’ state of 
the mantis, if emotions were to be attributed to insects. 
What this work illustrates is the ability to readily integrate a range of motivational variables, 
some of which might be construed as emotions (reluctantly, due to concerns over the inherent 
looseness of this term as mentioned in the introduction of this article) into a behavior-based 
architecture. The net effect is that the behaviors are no longer solely driven by external 
perceptions but now also by internal state. These states can be affected by elapsed time, 
perceived events, or other factors. Drawing on biologically inspired models of robotic control 
provides an easy mechanism by which motivational state can be introduced into robots that at 
least imitate lower-life forms in some respects. We now move forward and upward to look at 
how humans interact with each other and other species as a basis for capturing additional 
nuances of emotional behavior in robotic systems. 
 
Figure 3: Starting at the upper left and moving along the top, the robot is initially still due to a high fear 
level as a predator object is in view off to the right. Once that is removed, the robot moves towards a prey 
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object satisfying its need for hunger. Once its appetite has been satisfied it now ignores the food object and 
moves toward the tall object that represents a mate. 
4. Attachment Theory as a Basis for Robot Exploration 
 
We now investigate the relationship of parent and child as a basis for the child’s emotional state 
and its potential for use within robotics. In particular we look at Bowlby’s work  (Bowlby, 
1969) that focuses on emotional attachment, which is reflected in what we refer to as “comfort 
level”. In humans, both external (exogeneous) environmental conditions and internal 
(endogeneous) state determine this level of comfort, reflecting the perceived degree of safety in 
the current environment and the degree of normal functioning of our internal system.   
The input features of comfort consist of these two components, at least for infants (Dunn, 1977).  
Endogenous factors include hunger, body temperature, pain, and violent or sudden stimulation 
received by any of the infant’s sensors. One of the most significant exogeneous factors is 
environmental familiarity. Hebb’s Discrepancy Theory (Hebb, 1946) states that fear and 
discomfort are evoked by events that are very different from previous experiences.  (Dunn, 
1977) elaborates that whether or not the past experience with the current situation was pleasant, 
neutral, or unpleasant is significant. An infant brings to the evaluation of any situation a 
predisposition threshold on whether to react with pleasure or fear (Stroufe, 1974).  
(Bowlby, 1969) created a theory of attachment in which he pointed out that infants associate 
certain individuals (caregivers) with security and comfort.  They use these people as sources of 
comfort.   In their early years, children want to maintain close proximity to their caregiver, and 
the degree to which they want to maintain this proximity depends on the circumstances.  “The 
behavioral hallmark of attachment is seeking to gain and to maintain a certain degree of 
proximity to the object of attachment, which ranges from close physical contact under some 
circumstances to interaction or communication across some distance under other 
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circumstances.” (Ainsworth and Bell, 1970).  The mother-child relationship is the primary 
exemplar of this interaction where the child prefers to be close to the mother in unfamiliar 
situations, especially when young. Every attachment object has an attachment bond between 
itself and the child, where the force of the attachment is situationally dependent and is directed 
towards reducing the distance of separation between the child and the attachment object 
(Bowlby, 1969). 
Likhachev (Likhachev and Arkin, 2000) extrapolated these ideas to working robotic systems. 
Taking some liberty with formal attachment theory, we now view that an infant (robot) 
maximizes its exogenous and maximum endogenous comfort components by being physically 
collocated with its mother (object of attachment). The attractive force is a function of the 
attachment bond that corresponds to the object, the individual’s overall comfort level, and the 
separation distance.   
The intent here is not to create a robotic model of a human child, but rather to produce useful 
behavior in autonomous robotic systems. While robots are not children, there are nonetheless 
advantages to maintaining an attachment bond with certain individuals or objects, (e.g. 
caregivers, owners, military base, fuel supply, or familiar end-users), as they typically satisfy 
the robot’s endogenous needs (e.g., energy) while also providing a high-level of familiarity and 
predictability in the environment. Each attachment object has an associated attachment bond. 
The degree to which the robot bonds to a particular object depends on how its needs are met by 
that object and the level of comfort it can achieve.   
3.1. Computational Model of Attachment 
 
The result of attachment behavior is a response directed toward increasing or maintaining 
proximity with the attachment object  (Colin, 1996).  In a schema-based model, this results in an 
Arkin  17 
attractive vector directed toward the object of attachment of varying magnitude dependent upon 
the separation distance.  This vector magnitude (A) represents the intensity of the attachment, 
which is functionally:  
(1)                                                                               ,),,(                                                           dCfA α=
 
where C is the overall comfort level of a robot; α is the attachment bonding quality between the 
robot and the particular attachment object in question, and d is the distance between the robot 
and the attachment object. Specifically, A is defined as the product of the normal attachment 
maximum level N, quality of attachment α, and the amplification of the comfort component in 
the function by a proximity factor D: 
(2)                                                                    ),(                                                           CDNA ϕα ∗∗∗=
 
The normal attachment maximum level N defines the maximum magnitude of the attachment 
intensity when the object of attachment is a normal “mother”, so to speak.  The other factors in 
the function, with the exception of α, are normalized. The attachment bonding quality (α) 
should be dependent on the quality of care that the attachment object provides for the robot, but 
is set arbitrarily in advance for the results reported below. Setting α to 1 corresponds to a 
“normal mother” attachment object.  Setting α greater than 1 corresponds to “over-caring 
mother”, whereas decreasing α below 1 corresponds to “under-caring mother”. Setting α to 0 
corresponds to “no-care mother”, resulting in the complete absence of attachment behavior in a 
robot. 
 
The relationship between A and C expressed in the comfort component ϕ(C) is drawn from the 
following two sources.  (Feeney and Noller, 1996) describe comfort-seeking intensity in adults 
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as a function of anxiety and fear that is linear for secure adults, where adults typically form 
attachments with parents, siblings, friends, and partners. It is similarly treated linearly for the 
robot experiments that appear below. (Colin, 1996) identifies a low-level attachment behavior 
activation where the behavior has almost no effect but only monitors the proximity, and a strong 
activation where the behavior’s output overrides virtually all other behaviors in the system 
when the distance of separation becomes significant.  Mathematically this relationship can be 
described as follows: 
(3)                                                         ,
    if                                             
   if        **
































where Cl and Ch define low and high comfort activation levels, respectively; and Al and Ah are 
the corresponding intensity levels for the low and high activation levels. 
The proximity factor D is a function of the distance d from the robot to the attachment object.  
As defined, when the robot is very near the attachment object the proximity factor is set to 0, in 
effect zeroing the attachment force since the robot is already sufficiently close to its object of 
attachment. This results in a Safe Zone that forms a secure area where the robot receives 
maximum comfort.  When the robot moves outside this safe zone, the proximity factor grows, 
increasing the overall attachment force, until reaching a maximum at some distance.  This area 
between the safe zone and the distance where the maximum proximity factor occurs is called 
the Comfort Zone, (Fig. 4) which constitutes the normal working region for the robot. Outside 
of this comfort zone the attachment force is quite large and generally forces the robot to move 
into and stay within its comfort zone.   










Figure 4:  The safe and comfort zones of the robot around the object of attachment. 
 
3.2. Robotic Experiments 
 
Figure 5 depicts the effects of various settings of comfort levels on a simulated robot’s 
performance during an exploration task in the presence of an attachment object. As the robot 
becomes less comfortable it remains closer to its object of attachment. A complete statistical 
analysis of these and other results are presented in (Likhachev and Arkin, 2000). Similar results 
were obtained during actual robotic experiments (Figure 6). 
Safe Zone Comfort Zone
Object of attachment
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Figure 5.  3 minute runs of exploration behavior with the attachment object of attachment located at the 
center of the circle that defines the comfort zone. (a) No attachment behavior;  (b) attachment behavior with 
comfort level set 1.0 (maximum comfort); c) comfort level set to 0.0 (neutral comfort); d) comfort level set to 
-1.0 (maximum discomfort) 
a)              b) 
 
c)              d) 
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Figure 6: (Top) Nomad Robot conducting 5-minute explorations. The object of attachment is the tree. 
(Bottom) Results showing how average distance from attachment object increases as robot’s comfort level 
increases. 
The notion of emotional comfort as a basis for modulating behavior can have significant impact 
in controlling a robot’s performance as it moves through the world. This is not only of value in 
ensuring that the robot does not stray from a given task or area with which it is familiar but can 
also provide a basis for establishing inter-species bonding in entertainment robotics, where 
creating a pet robot that can effectively relate to a human is of great importance.  The next 
section of this article focuses on various aspects of human-robot interaction in this new 
application domain for robots. 
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5. Canine Ethology in Support of Human-Robot Bonding. 
 
One of the principal goals of entertainment robotics is to provide the illusion of life in a robot to 
a human. A strategy we have chosen to follow, in joint work with Sony Corporation (Arkin et 
al., 2001, Arkin et al., 2003), is to develop a computational model of behavior based on 
ethology.  In this work, we start to engage the concepts of motivational behavior in animals, 
specifically dogs; with that of emotionality experienced in humans. One of the goals is to 
produce appropriate emotional responses in people through observation and interaction with a 
robotic artifact. This requires the generation of natural behaviors as well as maintaining 
motivational/emotional states within the robot. Studies of the manifestation of emotions in 
humans and their similar occurrence as motivational behavior in animals can provide support 
for effective interactivity between a robot and a human (Breazeal, 2002; Dautenhamn, 1999; 
Fujita, 2001, Breazeal, this volume). By incorporating aspects of emotional and motivational 
behavior into a robotic architecture we, and others, (e.g., Breazeal and Scasselati, 1999), 
contend that a greater ability to relate to the end-user is provided.  
           
 
Figure 7: Various AIBO Robots. 
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The primary robotic system used for this work is Sony’s AIBO, a highly successful commercial 
product (Figure 7). A broad range of behaviors is available organized into multiple subsystems 
(Arkin et al., 2001). Their selection is related to the motivational state of the robot, maintained 
in what is referred to as the I/E (instinct/emotion) model. Ekman’s model (Ekman, 1994) has 
been influential in this work, and consists of 6 basic emotional states: happiness, anger, sadness, 
fear, surprise, and disgust (cf. Rolls’ dimensions (Rolls, this volume) and Ekman’s dimension as 
illustrated by Kismet (Breazeal, this volume)). Takanishi’s approach (Takanishi, 1999) is also 
used to reduce the overall internal state space into 3-dimensions: pleasantness, arousal, and 
confidence. The 6 basic emotional states are located within this 3-dimensional space. By 
establishing predefined levels of internal variables, such as hunger and thirst, and determining 
how the current state of the robot relates to those thresholds, pleasantness can be assessed. If 
these variables remain within the regulated range, the pleasantness is high. Arousal is controlled 
by both circadian rhythm and unexpected stimuli, while confidence is determined by the 
confidence (certainty) of recognized external stimuli. 
 The resulting emotional values affect the action-selection process for behavior eligibility for 
execution. Drawing on aspects of both McFarland’s motivational space (McFarland, 1974) and 
Blumberg’s action-selection mechanisms (Blumberg, 1994), particular behaviors are scheduled 
for execution on the robot that are consistent with the current set of environmental stimuli and 
the internal state of the robot itself. In the action selection module, a behavior is selected based 
on inputs derived from external stimuli (releasing mechanisms) and the robot’s current 
motivational state variables. A state-space diagram represents the mapping from these inputs 
onto the appropriate behavior to be activated. The details of this approach can be found in 
(Arkin et al., 2003).  
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Further extension of this research by Fujita has resulted in the EGO architecture (Fujita et al., 
2001a, 2001b) leading to potential applications in humanoid robots (Arkin et al 2003b). The 
generated motion patterns can be affected by the emotions themselves. (Fujita, 2001b) 
specifically addresses the symbol-grounding problem (Harnad, 1990) in this architecture, 
allowing the robot to learn to associate behaviors with specific symbols through the use of an 
“emotionally grounded symbol”, where the physically grounded symbol is associated with the 
change of internal variable state that occurs when the robot applies a behavior in response to the 
object. For example, when the robot hears the symbol’s name spoken, it knows which 
behavior(s) are associated with that symbol and can produce a change in the robot’s internal 
motivations. Thus, in a sense, the robot knows the meaning of the symbol in the way in which it 
affects both its internal state and what behaviors are the correct ones to use in the associated 
object’s presence. The symbols are grounded not only perceptually, by associating the correct 
perceptual stimuli with the spoken symbol, but also behaviorally, by producing the appropriate 
behavioral response in the presence of the stimuli that acts in a manner to produce a change in 
internal variables that are consistent with the IE model. This use of symbols for emotional 
modeling diverges somewhat from strict ethology, especially when compared to the more 
faithful canine behavioral modeling employed (Arkin et al, 2003), but keep in mind that the 
intent is to create robotic artifacts that successfully entertain and engender human-robot 
emotional bonding.  
More recent work has moved into expanding this architecture into humanoid behavior for the 
Sony SDR-4X robot (Fig. 8), which is also capable of emotional expression. Extensions to the 
EGO architecture include the introduction of a deliberative layer capable of planning (Arkin et 
al., 2003). Proprietary issues prevent a more thorough discussion at this time. 
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AIBO and SDR are neither dogs nor humans. They are entertainment robots intended to provide 
interesting and engaging experiences with people. The use of emotions in these systems is 
created with that particular purpose in mind. An underlying belief is that if a robot is capable of 
expressing itself not only through speech but also emotionally, they are more likely to be 
accepted by consumers. 
In all of the robots discussed thus far, internal state refers to the maintenance of a set of 
variables that reflect the emotional/motivation state of the machine. This appears to be 
consistent with Dolan’s definition of emotion that appears in the Introduction, with the 
exception that there is relatively little complexity involved in our implementation. These 
variables are updated continuously by arriving sensory information, and in some cases are 
updated by circadian rhythms and other factors. This set of states acts on the behavioral regime 
of the robot to modulate and/or select behaviors that best reflect the current set of emotional 
conditions. Considerably more complex models are possible, one of which is discussed in the 
next section.  
 
 
Figure 8: Sony SDR-4X manifesting a happy greeting consistent with its emotional state 
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6. A New Model, Summary and Conclusion  
 
We conclude the paper with the presentation of a new model under development in our 
laboratory at Georgia Tech, and then summarize the overarching themes of this article. 
6.1 Traits, Attitudes, Moods, and Emotions (TAME) 
 
We are not currently aware of any single computational model that captures the interaction 
between a wide range of time-varying affect-related phenomena, such as personality traits, 
attitudes, moods, and emotions. In humans, each of these components performs a distinct 
adaptive function. It is our research hypothesis that providing autonomous robots with similar 
easily recognizable affective cues may facilitate robot-human in complex environments.  
Moshkina (Moshkina and Arkin, 2003) has proposed a new affect model called TAME, which 
incorporates and unites Traits, Attitudes, Moods and Emotions as separate components with 
well-characterized interfaces in order to produce multi-scale temporal affective behavior for use 
in a behavior-based robotic system.  TAME draws from a number of related theories of 
personality, mood, emotion and attitudes, but it is intended to serve primarily as a basis for 
producing intelligent robotic behavior and not as a cognitive model of affect and personality.  
The Personality and Affect Module is currently being integrated into the Autonomous Robot 
Architecture (AuRA) (Arkin and Balch, 1997) as embodied in the MissionLab Mission 
Specification System2 (Mackenzie, Cameron, and Arkin, 1997). The personality and affect 
module modifies the underlying behavioral parameters, which directly affect currently active 
behaviors, similar to earlier work from our laboratory in homeostatic control (Arkin, 1992) and 
the work described for the praying mantis in Section 3 of this article. Moshkina’s conceptual 
view of the TAME model is presented in figure 9.  
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Psychologists have factored affective responses into at least these four components: Traits, 
Attributes, Moods, and Emotions. By attempting to apply temporal attributes to this 
differentiated set of affective response factors, we feel this can add clarity to the generation of 
affective behavior in robots through the generation of new computational models enable the 
composition of these time-varying patterns. This will hopefully give rise to mechanisms by 
which a robot’s responses can be more appropriately attuned to a human user’s needs, in both 
the short- and long-term. It is not intended to validate any particular theories of human affective 
processing, but rather to assist in creating better human-robot interaction. 
 
Figure 9: Integrated Model of Personality and Affect (TAME) 
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The four major components operate in different time and activation scales. Emotions are high 
activation and short-term, while moods are low-activation and relatively prolonged. Traits and 
attitudes determine the underlying disposition of the robot and are relatively time-invariant. The 
basis for each of these four components is discussed briefly below.  
Traits serve as an adaptation mechanism to specialized tasks and environments, whereas 
emotions mobilize the organism to provide a fast response to significant environmental stimuli. 
The Five-Factor Model (FFM) of Personality developed by (McCrae and Costa, 1996) serves as 
the basis for the trait components. Trait dimensions include Openness (O), Agreeableness (A), 
Conscientiousness (C), Extroversion (E), and Neuroticism (N). Traits influence a wide range of 
behavior, and are not limited to emotionally charged situations. 
Emotion, in the TAME context, is an organized reaction to an event that is relevant to the needs, 
goals, or survival of the organism (Watson, 2000). It is short in duration, noncyclical, and is 
characterized by a high activation state and significant energy and bodily resources expenditure. 
A typical set of emotions that we subscribe to includes joy, interest, surprise, fear, anger, 
sadness and disgust (Watson, 2000) and are continuously dynamically generated as emotion-
eliciting stimuli are detected.  
Moods bias behavior according to favorable/unfavorable environmental conditions, and are 
defined by the two independent categories of positive and negative affect (Revelle, 1995). They 
constitute a continuous affective state that represents low activation state and is less intense and 
thus expends less energy and bodily resources than emotion. Moods are mainly stimulus-
independent, and exhibit cyclical (circadian) variation according to time of day, day of the 
week, and season. 
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An attitude is a “learned predisposition to respond in a consistently favorable or unfavorable 
manner with respect to a given object” (Breckler and Wiggins, 1989). Attitudes guide behavior 
towards desirable goals and away from aversive objects, as well as facilitate decision-making 
process by reducing the decision space complexity. They are relatively time-invariant, 
object/situation specific, influenced by affect, and result in a certain behavior towards the 
object.  
To test the TAME model, a partial integration of the personality and affect module into the 
MissionLab system was undertaken, which is a supplemented version of the Autonomous Robot 
Architecture (Arkin and Balch; 1997). The interested reader is referred to (Moshkina and Arkin, 
2003) for additional details.  Research is now underway in the administration of formal usability 
studies to determine whether this form of affect can play a significant role in improving a user’s 
experience with a robot. 
6.2 Summary and Conclusion 
 
In the end, what can we learn from this journey through a broad range of motivations/emotions 
than span multiple species? I propose the following: 
• Emotions, at least to a roboticist, consist of a subset of motivations that can be used to 
dynamically modulate ongoing behavioral control in a manner consistent with survival 
of the robotic agent (Arkin and Vachtsevanos, 1990). The nuances surrounding which 
species possess ‘emotions’ versus ‘motivations’ and the terminological differences 
between these terms are best left to non-roboticists in my opinion, as it is unclear if the 
resolution to these semantic differences will have any impact whatsoever on our ability 
to build more responsive machines. Our community, however, sorely needs more and 
Arkin  30 
better computational models and processes of affect that effectively capture these 
components within a behavioral setting. 
• Human-robot interaction can be significantly enhanced by the introduction of emotional 
models that serve as much for the benefit of the human as well as the robot. 
• Motivational/Emotional models can be employed that span many, many different 
organisms and that can match the requirements of an equally diverse robotic population 
ranging from vacuum cleaners, to military systems, to entertainment robots, and others. 
All of these systems need to survive within their ecological niche and must respond to a 
broad range of threats towards their extinction or obsolescence. The principle of 
biological economy would argue that emotions/motivation exist in biology to serve a 
useful purpose and it is our belief that robots can only benefit by having a similar 
capability at their disposal. 
• The diversity of emotional models is something to celebrate and not lament, as they all 
can potentially provide fodder for robotic system designers. As I have often said, I 
would use phlogiston as a model if it provided the basis for creating better and more 
intelligent robots, even if it does not explain natural phenomena accurately. 
Finally, there is much more work to be done. This branch of robotics has only recently been 
enabled due to major computational and hardware advances that have only existed within the 
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